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Diego Azqueta and Gonzalo Delacámara
E xisting oil fields in Ecuador are approaching the end of their 
economic life, and permits to exploit new fields in the Amazon region 
are being granted. The possibility that deforestation may occur in some 
areas of high ecological value, as has happened in the past as a result 
of induced migration, justifies posing a simple question: would it be 
reasonable to exploit these new fields without causing deforestation? This 
paper does not claim to give an exhaustive answer to this question but, 
based on previous research, presents a simulation exercise in which the 
economic value of four tropical forest services are introduced, in order to 
evaluate the economic loss that deforestation would entail. It is further 
argued that the environmental impact appraisal should take into account 
the corresponding premium accorded to investment. In addition, the use 
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TABLE 1
Ecuador: Macroeconomic fi gures 
(US$ 2000)
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per capita GDP  1 333 1 295 … 1 382 1 411 1 501 1 550
Total external debt (US$ millions) 13 934 13 216  16 236 16 756 17 210 17 237
Total debt/GDP ratio (%) 69.0 85.1  67.0 61.0 56.2 47.2
Exports of goods and services (US$ millions) 5 278 5 905  5 809 6 366 7 370 7 917
Imports of goods and services (US$ millions) 5 454 4 939  7 194 6 915 7 683 8 720
Source: ECLAC, 2007.
Some underdeveloped countries are facing a foreign-
exchange shortage that has, over time, led to high 
levels of indebtedness and to a debt crisis. This debt 
burden poses very serious problems and greatly hinders 
any progress towards socio-economic development. In 
order to service this debt, a developing country that is 
experiencing balance-of-payments problems may try 
to obtain funds in the international fi nancial market. 
Yet any such loan will carry a high risk premium and 
therefore impose high interest rates. The rate of return 
of a dollar invested in this country will then be equal 
to this rate of interest, as will the social internal rate of 
return of the last public project rejected. It should then 
be no surprise that, facing the need to repay an ever-
increasing foreign debt, countries in this position may 
turn to their comparative advantage in terms of their 
environmental asset endowment—both by increasing 
their exports of natural resources and by enduring lower 
levels of environmental quality (Azqueta, 2007). As 
will be explored in more detail, the very high shadow 
price of foreign exchange in these countries makes this 
option seem economically rational in the short run.1
In all probability, however, this way of generating 
new foreign exchange will not only be unsustainable 
in the long run, but will also degrade the natural 
resource endowment, often irreversibly. Short-term 
economic calculus might lend support to such 
practices: logging permits produce much-needed hard 
currency, whereas standing, non-intervened primary 
forests produce hardly any at all. Yet, an elementary 
economic calculus may show that, not only might 
this be a sub-optimal allocation of resources from 
the global point of view, but also that, even in terms 
of economic rationality, the net gain is not that high 
and it would be worthwhile looking for better ways 
(although perhaps more costly ones in the short run) 
of exploiting natural resources.
Ecuador is a case in point. As table 1 shows, it 
is not only an underdeveloped country with serious 
poverty and destitution, but also highly indebted 
to the rest of the world. Though the debt burden is 
probably not the only cause, public expenditure in 
education, for example, amounted to 3.1% of GDP 
in 1990 with another 1.6% of public expenditure on 
health; these amounts fell to 1.1% in 2001 and 0.9% in 
2000, respectively (with a slight improvement in later 
years). Furthermore, the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line rose from 62.1% (with 26.2% 




  The authors would like to express their gratitude and recognition to 
César Ajamil, who passed away shortly after working on the project. 
His warm humanity will always be remembered.
1 The shadow price of foreign exchange refl ects its true scarcity and 
is expressed as a ratio that shows the actual deviation between this 
shadow (effi ciency) price and the offi cial exchange rate. In Colombia, 
during the 1980s, this ratio oscillated between 1.18 and 1.75; in 
Panama between 1.13 and 1.21; and in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela it was 1.08 in 1989 (Londero, 1992). Unfortunately such 
information is not available for Ecuador.
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The main sources of foreign exchange, apart from 
Ecuadorian workers’ remittances,2 show the country’s 
dependence on exploitation of its natural resources 
endowment of crude petroleum, bananas and fi sh. 
As a result of this pattern of specialization, in 2004, 
79% of Ecuadorian exports were primary products 
(51% from the energy sector), and another 14.2% 
were industrial products based on natural resources 
(ECLAC, 2006).
This pattern of specialization has entailed very 
serious environmental consequences:
(i) Transforming mangroves into shrimp farms along 
the Pacifi c Coast has caused the almost complete 
disappearance of one of the most ecologically 
valuable ecosystems worldwide (Costanza, D’Arge 
and others, 1997).
2 Remittances from Ecuadorian workers in the United States 
amounted to US$ 1.4 billion in 2001 (Jacôme, 2004).
(ii) The intensive use of pesticides, fungicides and 
fertilizers in banana plantations leads to eutrophication 
and degradation of aquatic ecosystems.3
(iii) The rapid increase in tourism-related development 
in the Galapagos is creating mounting pressure on 
this fragile area. In 1997, 21 out of 57 sites exceeded 
their visitor carrying capacity. This could harm the 
future prospects of the tourist industry: more than 
50% of the visitors interviewed believed that there 
was congestion in the islands, and 21.8% declared 
themselves highly annoyed by it (García, 2000).
(iv) Lastly, oil production for export in the Amazon 
region constitutes a recent and grave threat to this 
unique ecosystem.
It is to this last challenge that we would like to 
turn our attention.
II
Oil exports from Ecuador
Ecuador is one of Latin America’s largest crude 
oil exporters, though it has recently been finding 
it increasingly difficult to raise production levels. 
According to the International Energy Agency (Oil 
Market Report, various issues), in 2002, PetroEcuador, 
the State company that accounts for more than 55% of 
total production, recorded 0.4 million barrels per day 
(bpd), a 10-year low. This fi gure has improved somewhat 
in recent years and reached 0.53 million bpd in 2006.
Most production is located in the Eastern 
Amazonian region, called the “Oriente” (Shushufi ndi, 
Sacha, Libertador, Cononaco, Cuyabeno, Lago Agrio 
and Auca oil fi elds), with the majority of the 4.6 billion 
barrels of proven reserves also located in the eastern 
part of this region. At this time, the oil is transferred 
from the city of Lago Agrio, in the Amazon basin, to 
the Balao terminal near the city port of Esmeraldas 
on the Pacifi c coast, through the Trans-Ecuadorian 
Pipeline System (or SOTE, the acronym of its Spanish 
name). This pipeline, built in the early 1970s, has been 
upgraded several times (June 2000 being the most 
recent), and has a capacity of 300,000 bpd.
Continued oil exports could be expected to have 
positive consequences for the Ecuadorian economy. 
As mentioned above, foreign exchange earned via oil 
exports reduces the need to turn to the international 
fi nancial market and therefore reduces the internal 
rate of return of acceptable public investment, thus 
potentially promoting socio-economic development. 
Yet, along with this positive effect on the economy and 
the infl ow of foreign exchange, oil extraction also has 
negative impacts on the environment. Experience shows 
that oil-related operations (exploration, exploitation 
and crude transfer) have signifi cant impacts on the 
ecosystem in which they take place, which in this 
case is a primary tropical rainforest (Gupta and Asher, 
1998). Oil-related operations introduce changes in 
land uses that are both direct (land occupied by 
wells, roads, campgrounds, etc.), and indirect (new 
activities taking place as well as old activities being 
abandoned). Of course, oil-related operations also 
affect the functioning of the ecosystem itself, and the 
fl ow of natural services it provides.
3 It is also causing serious damage to shrimp farms (Colburn, 1997).
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The impacts of oil activities can be grouped under 
three main headings.4
(i) Direct impacts. These impacts are directly linked 
to the main oil operations (exploration, extraction, 
transport and pumping), including:
— Atmospheric emission of pollutants, whether from 
accidental releases or from gas burning. Volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) from oil remediation 
ponds should also be included.
— Accidental and recurrent oil discharges and spills 
onto the ground and into aquatic systems (ground 
and surface water) which may eventually affect 
human health. A study of river pollution conducted 
in 2001 in the municipality of Shushufi ndi found 
that most surface water carried high levels of 
chemical contamination from the local oil industry; 
this problem was also found in urban wells.5
— Discharges and spills of media (the water that 
accompanies oil when pumped, which is highly 
polluted).
(ii) Indirect impacts. These impacts are not directly 
related to oil operations, but are closely linked. Among 
them is the construction of new access roads, which 
favour the movement of would-be colonists and the 
actual colonization of new land.
(iii) Induced impacts. These are linked to auxiliary 
activities, including the development of urban 
settlements, which provide basic services such as health, 
education, and retail trade to the local population (oil 
sector workers, settlers, etc.).
4  To these impacts must be added those related to oil transfer, i.e., to 
the pipeline. The new heavy crude pipeline (OCP) under construction, 
which will connect new fi elds with the coast, is “in substantial 
non-compliance with World Bank Group Social and Environmental 
Safeguard Policies”, according to an independent report issued in 
September 2002 by Robert Goodland (2002), former head of the 
World Bank’s Environmental Department. Environmentalists fear 
that the construction of the pipeline will do serious harm to one of 
the world’s most important bird sanctuaries: the Mindo Nambillo 
Cloudforest Reserve, which is also a major eco-tourism destination. 
Ecuador’s Environment Ministry temporarily suspended the OCP 
licence in March 2002, following damage to the forest caused by 
road construction. As for the existing pipeline (SOTE), in June 2002 
villagers from the Napo province occupied the El Salado pumping 
station and shut off some valves, stopping the fl ow for several days. 
III
Settlement and deforestation
At present, the main oil fields being exploited are 
located near the Cuyabeno Reserve, one of the 
country’s most valuable ecological areas. The Cuyabeno 
Reserve is home to six different indigenous nations, in 
several communities: Siona, Secoya, Cofán, Quichua 
(Naporunas), Shuar and Achuar.6 The Siona, Secoya and 
Cofán were there at the time of the Spanish colonization; 
the Shuar and Achuar moved into the territory as cheap 
labour in the second half of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century in the wake of the 
rubber boom. The Quichua (Naporunas) were the last 
to arrive as settlers in the mid-twentieth century.
This situation changed dramatically in 1967, when 
Texaco opened the fi rst oil fi eld in the region (Lago 
Agrio) and the building of new roads began. In 1971 
the road connecting Quito with Lago Agrio, built by 
Texaco, was opened; the Lago Agrio-Tarapoa road 
(built by PetroEcuador-City) was fi nished; and, in 1979, 
both the Pacayacu-Los Tetetes and Tarapoa-Palma Roja 
roads (also built by PetroEcuador-City) were opened 
In November 2002, PetroEcuador announced that it would re-route 
the Papallacta-Lago Agrio section because of the danger of landslides 
following eruption of the Reventador volcano.
5 In 1993, the Cofán people sued Texaco for alleged spills of more 
than 30 billion gallons of toxic products in the period 1964-1992. 
The New York Court of Justice rejected this claim in 1996 on the 
grounds that the case should have been brought before an Ecuadorian 
court. However, in 1998, the Court of Appeal overruled this decision 
stating that the Cofán people were entitled to sue Texaco before a 
United States court; this they did once more, only to be rejected 
again in May 2002 by Judge Jed Rakoff of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.
6 The Tetetes, another indigenous people in the area, seem now to 
be extinct. Ironically, this is the name Texaco gave to one of its fi rst 
operating oil wells.
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up. Altogether, more than 200 km of new roads were 
opened in less than 20 years.
The opening of new roads facilitated the migration 
of people from other parts of the country. They settled 
as farmers alongside the roads, burning and clearing 
the tropical forest to transform it into agricultural and 
pasture land. As a result, the population of the Oriente 
region increased from 70,000 in 1950 to 372,533 in 
1990, an increase of 432%, or 10.8% growth per annum 
(Brown, Digiacinto and others, 1996). In a matter of a 
few years, more than 200,000 people entered the area 
as settlers. Typically, such farmers occupy an area of 
250m along the road, with a depth of 2,000m, adding 
another 2,000m depth as “reserve”. When the first 
portion of cleared land is exhausted (after fi ve or six 
years), they use the reserve, and then move even deeper 
into the interior.7 Furthermore, to provide the public 
and private services required by the newcomers (both 
oil workers and migrants), new urban areas emerged, 
with their own demands on nature (water, waste, and 
so forth), and on forest land: Lago Agrio, Shushufi ndi, 
Pompeya, Tarapoa, and some others.
Signifi cant deforestation has resulted from this 
migration. The country overall had 13.9 million 
hectares (ha) of forest area in 1990, 11.9 ha in 2000 
and 10.9 ha in 2005 (ECLAC, 2007). According to the 
fi ndings of the PETRAMAZ Project, more than 26,000 ha 
of primary forest were lost in the area of oil operations 
during the period from 1976 to 1986, and another 
55,330 ha were lost in the following decade; of that 
area, 6,774 ha were devastated by tornadoes in 1984. 
This gives an average loss of 3,230 ha per year in the 
fi rst period, and 5,532 ha in the second.8
The relationship between this deforestation and 
the arrival of new settlers was straightforward: in 1997, 
59.7% of the loss of primary forest took place in a band 
of 5 km around the main roads, and another 38.6% 
within the adjacent kilometre. The rate of deforestation 
for the entire area of infl uence of these operations 
was 2-2.5 times the average rate of deforestation in 
the country, which was already very high (1.4% per 
year in 1997-2000 and 1.7% in 2000-2005). Although 
this mostly took place outside the protected areas, 
it endangered not only the buffer zones but in some 
cases the protected zones themselves: in 1993, 50,000 
ha from the Cuyabeno Reserve were degazetted by the 
Ecuadorian government because the land had been 
occupied by settlers.
7  The pattern of settlement, implemented by the Ecuadorian Institute 
for Agrarian Reform (IERAC) under the presidency of Velasco 
Ibarra, defi ned an “optimal unit” as covering 250m wide along the 
road, and extending 2.5 km deep into the forest, giving an average 
size of 50 ha per plot.
IV 
The economic consequences of settlement 
Unfortunately, this migration does not seem to have 
signifi cantly improved the standard of living for the 
newcomers. Between September 1998 and March 1999, 
a survey was carried out along the two main axes of 
settlement in the area: the Chiritza-Tarapoa-Palma Roja 
road (105 km), and the Chiritza-Pacayacu-Los Tetetes 
road (54 km). Overall, 1,644 farms (883 along one 
road and 761 along the other), with a population of 
9,248 inhabitants (5,211 and 4,037, respectively), were 
surveyed.9 Of all the land area studied, 76,600 ha were 
used either for agriculture or as pasture land and another 
57,000 ha were left in “reserve”. Approximately 45% 
of the cultivated land was sown with perennial crops 
(coffee, cocoa, plantain and bananas) and 13% to annual 
crops (maize, cassava and rice); the remaining 42% was 
used as pasture land. Given the characteristics of the 
soil and, unfortunately, in many cases, inappropriate 
agricultural techniques (more suited to the migrants’ 
region of origin), the yields obtained have been much 
lower than the national average:
— In the case of coffee grown as a market commodity 
crop, average yields were 66% of the national average 
(which is already low by international standards).
— For cassava, the region’s second main market 
commodity product, the average yield was only 
62% of the national average.
8  See also Mena and others (2006).
9  The survey was carried out by Maiguashca and Asociados Cia. Ltd., 
under a contract with the PETRAMAZ Project, between September 
1998 and March 1999.
62 C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 4  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 8
OIL EXTRACTION AND DEFORESTATION: A SIMULATION EXERCISE  •  DIEGO AZQUETA AND GONZALO DELACÁMARA
— Lastly, the picture is even more discouraging for 
crops grown for household consumption: rice, 
20% of the national average yield; maize, 30%; 
bananas, 40%; and plantain, 30%.
For the migrants, the social benefits related to 
employment generation have been minimal as well: less 
than 1% of them are employed in oil-related operations.
Thus, it is not surprising that, according to the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB, 2001), the Northern 
Amazonian Region is one of the most depressed areas 
in Ecuador, with 57.3% of the population being destitute 
and a poverty level as high as 79%, compared with the 
rural average in the country (47%). Health services 
are scarce where they exist at all (Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing (MIDUVI), 1999): only 12% 
of people in the region’s rural areas have access to 
drinking water (compared with 80% in urban areas); 2% 
are served by sewerage systems (28% in urban areas); 
and 3% have some kind of garbage disposal service 
(59% of urban dwellers). The incidence of diarrhoea 
in the area is 2,453 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared 
with 1,315 and 1,724 per 100,000 in the provinces of 
Pichincha and Guayas, respectively (Ministry of Public 
Health, 2000).
V
Economic and environmental consequences
of deforestation
Tropical rainforests provide environmental services that 
are lost altogether through deforestation. These services 
fall within several broad categories.
1. Economic functions
Under this heading we include those goods and services 
that have a market price. Chief among these are wood 
and non-wood products (fruits, animals, ornamental 
plants, medicines, latex) used by the local population. 
These commodities can be directly consumed by the 
population or used in small-scale local trade. The 
extraction of wood and non-wood products may be done 
sustainably or unsustainably (as in the case of mining), 
but it is the fi rst case that is of interest here.
Grimes, Loomis and others (1994) conducted an 
experiment on three one-hectare permanent forest plots 
at the Jatum Sacha Biological Station, located near the 
Cuyabeno Reserve, on the southern bank of the Napo 
River. Two of the study plots were located in fi rm-ground 
forest, with red earth at about 400m above sea level, 
and the third was along the bank of the Napo River, 
in fl oodplain forest with alluvial soil at an elevation of 
350m. The authors computed the net value obtained 
from seven fruits, three medicinal barks and one resin, 
taking into account the local market price for these 
products or their close substitutes, the average distance 
to local markets (30 km), the transportation mode (bus), 
and the time required for extraction, transportation and 
sales. The net annual value obtained from the three 
plots was US$ 146.93, US$ 136.06 and US$ 62.87, 
respectively.10 In contrast, the timber value of the plot 
closest to the road was US$ 163 —but if the timber was 
to be sustainably harvested, with a rotation length of 40 
years, the net present value (NPV) of the timber would 
amount to just US$ 189 (applying a 5% discount rate), 
far from the NPV of the non-wood products harvested 
(US$ 2,939, US$ 2,721 and US$ 1,257, respectively). 
Hence, logging activities have very low profi tability if 
performed on a sustainable basis.11
2. Tourism and recreation functions
Tropical forests can serve as a basis for eco-tourism. 
When this is the case, two main benefi ts may accrue 
from its preservation. On the one hand, visitors usually 
experience a net gain in consumer surplus, i.e. a positive 
difference between their willingness to pay to enjoy the 
experience, and what they actually do pay, directly 
10 This is also the figure suggested by Torras (2000). It is also 
within the range recorded by van Beukering, Cesar and others 
(2003): US$ 5 per ha in the Brazilian Amazon and US$ 422 in the 
Peruvian jungle.
11 See, for example, Seroa da Motta and Ferrz do Amaral, 2000. 
Smith, Mourato and others (2000) also fi nd that in the Peruvian 
Amazon, the profi tability of sustainable logging ranks second to slash 
and burn agriculture for settlers (see also Henrich, 2000).
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TABLE 2
Ecuador: Number of Tourists visiting the Cuyabeno Reserve, offi cial fi gures
Year Ecuadorian International Total International
    (percentage)
1989 173 581 754 77
1990 333 644 977 66
1991 612 855 1 467 58
1992 945 1 433 2 378 60
1993 820 1 484 2 304 64
1994 815 3 337 4 152 80
1995 1 582 3 375 4 957 68
1996 1 994 5 445 7 439 73
1997 1 239 4 410 5 649 78
1998 1 696 6 118 7 814 78
Source: Galvin (2000).
and indirectly (through the expenditure of time). On 
the other hand, there is a multiplier effect associated 
with the economic activity of tourism; it benefi ts the 
country as a whole and may benefi t the local population 
as well. Eco-tourism activities generate income, create 
employment and produce foreign exchange: tourism 
is an important source of foreign exchange for the 
Ecuadorian economy. Despite restrictions on the 
number of visitors, the Galapagos Islands are the most 
popular destination. The second most popular eco-
tourism destination is the area discussed above, namely 
the Cuyabeno Reserve. Table 2 shows the number of 
tourists visiting the area in the 1990s.12
These tourists are mostly foreigners and pay an 
entrance fee of US$ 20 in high season; Ecuadorians 
pay US$ 1. There are 18 licensed companies and they 
charge from US$ 30 to US$ 120 per day for a three- 
to fi ve-day visit (with a median value of US$ 45 per 
day); they paid the Ecuadorian Government US$ 8,800 
in 1998 for licenses to operate in the area. According 
to Galvin, the average expenditure of a foreign tourist 
visiting the Reserve is US$ 369 (median US$ 240).
Several authors13 have carried out insightful 
stakeholder analysis to discover how changes in they 
total economic value of natural areas will affect various 
groups such as the local population, the logging 
companies, and so on. Some fi gures they have obtained 
may hint at the importance of tourism to the local 
population. The Siona Community of Puerto Bolívar 
(160 people) earned a total of US$ 104,000 in 1998, 
mostly from canoe and cabin rentals. The Quichua 
community of Zancudo (110 people) and Playas de 
Cuyabeno (175) earned some additional US$ 62,800 
and US$ 39,600, respectively (mainly from tour 
operator payments and handicraft sales), whereas the 
Cofán community of Zábalo (115) made a total of 
almost US$ 40,000 (Galvin, 2000).
In addition, contingent valuation and travel cost 
methods can be used to calculate the net consumer 
surplus gain for visitors; we estimate it to be US$ 30 
per visitor.14 The consumer surplus will not be lost to 
the economy because the tourist is likely to go on to 
another place —often, though not necessarily, in Ecuador 
also— and spend additional money there. In this case, 
the net loss will only be the required investment in new 
facilities and the net revenue lost until they become 
operative. In this exercise it is assumed, for simplicity, 
that eco-tourists move to an alternative location in 
another country.
Lastly, there is an intrinsic value that people assign 
to the preservation of the Reserve. If the willingness 
to pay for improved conservation measures in the 
14 Baldares, Laarman and others (1990) discovered a willingness to 
pay an extra US$ 30 per visit to protected natural areas in Costa Rica, 
very close to the fi gure obtained by Tobias and Mendelsohn (1991) 
for these same areas: US$35. Adger, Brown and others (1995) offer a 
fi gure of US$3 per visit for those tourists that visited Mexican native 
forests within a package that included other items, and US$ 70 for 
those just interested in the forests.
12 The actual fi gure may be a little higher because of the number of 
non-recorded visitors, who avoid the payment of the required fees.
13 For example, van Beukering, Cesar and others, 2003).
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Reserve can be considered as a good proxy for this 
value, Galvin (2000) found that, on average, visitors 
to the Reserve are willing to pay an extra US$ 35 for 
this purpose.
3. Environmental functions
Tropical forests provide many environmental functions 
and services. Three of these are of major interest. First, 
they protect against both water and wind soil erosion, 
which affect cultivated land, infrastructure maintenance 
costs, the economic life of dams and water quality. 
Second, tropical forests are a natural carbon deposit, 
and typically their transformation into agricultural 
and range land lessens their ability to hold carbon. 
Third, tropical forests are a reservoir of biodiversity. 
The Cuyabeno Reserve, for instance, houses one of 
the world’s biggest diversity of trees (473 species) 
together with 514 species of birds, 117 of mammals, 
and 176 of reptiles.
Biodiversity loss is diff icult to measure, let 
alone to value in economic terms. The value of 
biodiversity in the development of new medicines 
and pharmaceuticals has been assigned a wide range 
of values: from US$ 7 per ha (Ruitenbeck, 1992) up 
to US$ 20 (Fearnside, 1997; Mendelsohn, 1994), with 
most estimates using the methodology put forward 
by Pearce and Puroshothaman (1992). Adge, Brown 
and others (1995) arrive at a similar fi gure to the fi rst 
one, US$ 6.4 per ha, but within a much wider array 
of values: US$ 1– US$ 90.
As for the damage that deforestation causes to 
the capacity of the carbon reservoir, Brown, Pearce 
and others (1993) fi nd that transforming a hectare of 
open forest into agricultural or range land has a cost of 
US$ 300 – US$ 500 per ha (using a value of US$ 10 
per metric ton of carbon). Transforming a secondary 
closed forest into agricultural or pasture land has a 
cost per ha of US$ 1,000 – US$ 1,500. If it is primary 
tropical forest being transformed, the loss will amount 
to US$ 2,000 per ha.
4. Cultural functions
Lastly, it should be noted that tropical forests form 
part of the cultural identity of some peoples. When 
the forests disappear there is a loss not only in terms 
of traditional knowledge (often treasured by elders in 
local communities), but also in terms of identity and 
cultural diversity.
The transformation of tropical forests because 
of oil extraction and related activities, both direct 
and induced, will cause a total or partial loss of the 
ecosystem’s ability to provide the above functions.15
15 These fi gures are in line with those produced by Adger, Brown 
and others (1995) and Pearce and Moran (1994): US$ 650 – US$ 
3,400 per ha, taking into account that these authors use a different 
price (US$ 20) per carbon ton.
VI 
The economic cost of developing new fi elds:
a simulation exercise
As pointed out above, deforestation in the Oriente has 
taken place mostly outside the protected areas so far, 
although it reaches to their limits.
The future, however, looks grimmer. Permits to 
explore and exploit new oil fi elds to the east of the 
existing ones, even inside “untouchable areas” (the 
highest level of protection) are being granted, chiefl y 
in the Tiputini-Ipishingo-Tambococha (TIT) oil fi eld. 
TIT may hold 20% of Ecuador’s oil reserves, totalling 
920 million barrels of low quality high-density oil. TIT 
may produce 100,000 barrels a day for 12 years and 
then produce at a declining rate for another 13 years, 
at a cost of US$ 12 per barrel. No one would deny 
Ecuador’s right to tap its natural resources and so obtain 
badly needed foreign exchange. Thus it is important 
to analyse the best way to proceed when dealing with 
this type of dilemma. In this, past experience may 
shed some light. 
To this end, it might be useful to have an idea 
of the economic cost of deforestation in both the 
Cuyabeno and Yasuní reserves. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, things 
can be done differently: oil can be extracted while 
at the same time trying to minimize deforestation. 
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Clearly this would be more expensive, but would it be 
justifi ed in terms of the environmental harm avoided? 
What would be the economically justifi able amount 
of investment to avoid this environmental loss? We 
do not claim to give an exhaustive answer, but simply 
to show that it may be worthwhile to develop one. A 
simple simulation exercise may serve to give a fi rst, 
rough approximation.
We will assume that opening the new fi elds will 
require new roads to connect them to the main operating 
centres. A rate of deforestation similar to that seen in 
the past will then take place when the new oil fi elds 
are opened. We use the above costs of deforestation 
and apply them to an area that is experiencing a rate 
of deforestation of 8% per year (for simplicity, we 
assume this to be constant) because of oil-exploitation-
related operations, including induced migration and 
urbanization. We assume that an initial 2,000 ha are 
cut down in the fi rst year; this is similar, on average, 
to the rate experienced around the original oil fi elds 
(Mena, Barbieri and others, 2006; table 3).
Next, some value should be introduced for each of 
the above services lost. Of all the economic functions 
that tropical forests perform, four will be valued: 
the production of timber and non-timber products 
(NTP); eco-tourism; biodiversity preservation; and 
carbon sequestration. We will not consider protection 
against fl oods, erosion and fi res, or water production. 
Therefore, the resulting value will clearly be an 
underestimation, but will be useful for assessing the 
amount of investment that would be justifiable, in 
effi ciency terms.
Ideally, it would be convenient to relate each 
of these functions to a quantitative measure of 
deforestation, such as per hectare. This is possible for 
functions like carbon sequestration, but not for all of 
the other functions. The reason is that dose-response 
functions are not only non-linear, but tend to have 
critical ranges. There is no point in trying to estimate the 
economic value of biodiversity per hectare: it depends 
on which hectare. The fi rst hectare lost would have zero 
value, whereas one close to a critical threshold would 
have maximum value. In between, there is a function 
whose shape is unknown. Nevertheless, we will assume 
a given value per hectare.16 One could also work out the 
amount of wood and non-wood products in an average 
hectare of tropical forest, but this does not mean that 
the local population would lose those products if forest 
16 Van Beukering, Cesar and others (2003) also made the simplifying 
assumptions that dose-response functions (ecosystem response 
functions) are linear, do not show irreversibilities and are not affected 
by thresholds.
TABLE 3
Ecuador: Economic cost of deforestation (US$): principal componentsa
(Dollars)
Year Deforested Value of non- Number Value of Carbon Value of Value of Total cost
 area  timber product of visitors ecotourism released carbon biodiversity (US$)
 (ha) (US$ 115.3  (US$ 20 fee (metric released lost
  per ha)  per visitor) tons) (US$ 25 per  (US$ 7
      ton of CO2 per ha)
      equivalent)
1 2 000 230 600 6 000 120 000 400 000 7 334 000 14 000 7 698 600
5 2 431 280 296 7 293 145 861 486 203 8 914 523 17 017 9 357 696
10 3 103 357 736 9 308 186 159 620 531 11 377 441 21 719 11 943 055
15 3 960 456 572 11 880 237 592 791 973 14 520 818 27 719 15 242 701
20 5 054 582 715 15 162 303 234 1 010 780 18 532 653 35 377 19 453 979
25 6 450 743 708 19 351 387 012 1 290 040 23 652 883 45 151 24 828 754
30 8 232 949 181 20 000 400 000 1 646 454 30 187 738 57 626 31 594 545
35 10 507 1 211 422 20 000 400 000 2 101 339 38 528 054 73 547 40 213 023
40 13 410 1 546 116 20 000 400 000 2 681 900 49 172 645 93 867 51 212 627
45 17 114 1 973 279 20 000 400 000 3 422 860 62 758 140 119 800 65 251 219
50 21 843 2 518 459 20 000 400 000 4 368 533 80 097 057 152 899 83 168 415
Source: Author’s own calculations.
a The table presents the main results of these assumptions for a 50-year period.
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land were to be transformed into agricultural land. 
In many cases, the actual cost would simply be the 
opportunity cost of the extra time required to fetch 
the same products from farther away. Again, we will 
assume that the product is lost or, alternatively, that 
the marginal value of time is equal to the value of 
foregone output.
The following unit values will be used:
— Non-wood products: US$ 115.3 per ha (the average 
income obtained in the three plots analysed in 
the area).
— Eco-tourism: a loss of US$ 20 per visitor (the 
amount paid in dollars by foreign tourists both 
to the Ecuadorian Government and to the local 
population). We assume an initial number of 
5,000 visitors, 80% foreigners, growing at 5% 
per year, and not exceeding a carrying capacity 
of 20,000.
— Biodiversity: US$ 7 per ha (a value in the lower 
range of those given in the literature).
— Carbon sequestration: a loss of 200 metric tons 
of carbon for each ha of tropical forest converted 
into agricultural land, at a price of US$ 5 per 
metric ton.
Assuming a 5% social discount rate, the NPV of the 
environmental costs associated with the deforestation 
process would be:
NPV = US$ 451 million
Table 3 is a simple illustration of the fact that 
some investment may be socially warranted in trying 
to mitigate these costs. A sensitivity analysis is very 
easy to carry out, and helps to identify some critical 
values. If, for instance, we take a value of US$ 10 per 
ha for non-wood products (we consider US$ 115 to be 
too high), the NPV will drop only slightly, to US$ 355 
million. If, on the other hand, we vary the price of a 
metric ton of carbon, the overall change is greater.
Two further qualifi cations are worth considering.
VII 
The value of investment in an
underdeveloped country
The above exercise is applicable to developed economies 
that are in an inter-temporal equilibrium and where 
the rate of savings is optimal. In underdeveloped 
countries this is not the case, and investible benefi ts 
have a premium over their consumption equivalent: 
the social marginal productivity of capital (the 
accounting rate of interest, refl ecting the change over 
time of the social value of investment) is higher than 
the consumption rate of interest. In other words, the 
social marginal productivity of capital (ρ) is greater 
than the consumption rate of interest (i) (Azqueta, 
2007, chapter 5).
In this case, environmental impacts that give rise 
to greater (or lower) present consumption possibilities 
for society as a whole should not be treated on an equal 
footing with those that affect investment fl ows (future 
consumption).17
To take account of this, one simple method is to 
clearly divide all items belonging to costs and benefi ts 
into those that affect present consumption possibilities 
and those that modify investment funds, to introduce a 
premium on those investment fl ows and then add it to 
the more conventional net consumption benefi ts. The 
consumption rate of interest would then be used to 
calculate the NPV of environmental impacts as a whole. 
This premium (λ) takes something like the following 
form (Azqueta, 1985, pp.: 97-101):
 λ = (1 - s 
r) ρ
  i - s r  ρ
with sr being the rate of re-investment of investment 
benefi ts.
17 The same qualifi cation should of course apply to oil exports (they 
give rise, directly or indirectly, to investment funds). It does not apply 
here though, since we are not advocating an end to oil exports but 
rather a different approach.
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Traditionally, the value of the social marginal 
productivity of capital (ρ) has been obtained either by 
analysing the internal rate of return of the best public 
investment projects to be rejected because of lack of 
funds, or from a macroeconomic point of view, by 
looking at the overvaluation of the domestic currency 
(i.e., the shadow price of foreign exchange). Now 
that many developing countries have liberalized their 
foreign exchange markets and their import fl ows, the 
situation is somewhat different:
(i) For countries that have liberalized their foreign-
exchange markets, but not yet their trade fl ows, 
the shadow price of foreign exchange (refl ecting 
the higher domestic price in relation to the 
international price of a representative basket 
of commodities) still represents this hidden 
overvaluation of the local currency.
(ii) Some countries have liberalized both import 
fl ows and foreign-exchange markets. This does 
not mean, however, that their rate of savings is 
optimal. The government is likely to be facing 
a serious budget constraint and a foreign-debt 
crisis at the same time, and socially valuable 
investment is continually being postponed. Taking 
into account the relationship between these twin 
defi cits (internal and external), a good indication 
of the social value of foreign exchange would 
be the price the authorities have to pay to gain 
access to credit in world fi nancial markets, i.e., 
the interest rate differential that would be charged 
in these markets.
Thus there are ways to refl ect quantitatively the 
fact that investment possibilities (mostly in terms of 
foreign exchange) are at a premium in underdeveloped 
economies. Following a conservative approach, we will 
assume that λ = 2 (the social marginal productivity 
of capital is double the social discount rate, which is 
4%); alternatively, one could vary this value as part of 
a sensitivity analysis. Therefore, once environmental 
impacts have been identified and properly valued, 
they should be classifi ed into two categories: those 
related to present consumption, and those affecting 
investment possibility fl ows. The latter should then 
be multiplied by the corresponding shadow price of 
investment, and the result discounted to obtain the NPV 
of environmental impacts.
The production of non-wood items for own-
consumption, or to be traded in local markets, can 
be easily considered a consumption benefit. On the 
other hand, both biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration can be considered as investment benefi ts, 
as long as the country is able to charge someone for 
this service. This would be the case, for instance, if a 
pharmaceutical company pays to secure access to the 
territory or if the role of forests is eventually recognized 
within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
same applies to dollars paid as entrance fees by foreign 
visitors: they help ease balance-of-payment diffi culties.
Taking this into account and assuming that 
Ecuador reaches the optimum rate of savings in 50 
years, so that λ would again be equal to 1, the present 
value of the environmental costs associated with 
deforestation would be:
NPV = US$ 624 million
that is, an increase of 40%.
VIII 
Discounting environmental impacts
Discounting environmental impacts that may last a 
long time, or even be irreversible, is a diffi cult task. 
The issue is actually one of uncertain intergenerational 
equity, coupled with the fact that those impacts arising 
in the very long run have a present value close to 
zero. The conventional way of calculating the social 
discount rate (the consumption rate of interest: i), is 
based on both the expected rate of income growth (g), 
and the marginal utility of global consumption (η) plus, 
sometimes, a pure time preference factor (δ):
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TABLE 4
Ecuador: Total value of deforestationa 
(US$ million)
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPAL RESULTS
 λ = 1 λ = 1 λ > 1 λ > 1
 Value of CO2 Value of CO2 Value of CO2 Value of CO2
 equivalent equivalent equivalent equivalent
 $5 per ton $20 per ton $5 per ton $20 per ton
r = 4% Value of NTP 421 586 595 828
 $10 per ha
r = 4% Value of NTP 451 616 624 857
 $115 per ha
r = 4% (years 1-5) Value of NTP 1 178 1 641 1 514 2 110
r = 3% (years 6-25) $10 per ha
r = 2% (years 26-50)b
r = 4% (years 1-5) Value of NTP 1 265 1 728 1 601 2 197
r = 3% (years 6-25) $115 per ha
r = 2% (years 26-50)
Source: Author’s own calculations.
a r = discount rate.
b As recommended in Weitzman (2001).
and C is the level of consumption, and U the social 
level of utility.
Using a conventional discount factor based on 
this rate of discount (e.g. e-it) would imply that the 
welfare of future generations is of no relevance to a 
decision to be made now. On the other hand, using a 
zero discount rate would be equivalent to saying that 
regardless of how much better off future generations 
are in terms of needs being satisfi ed, any benefi t they 
may receive would have the same value in terms of 
social welfare now, as if it were to be received by the 
present generation (something we tend to reject on 
equity grounds). Thus, to avoid the tyranny of both the 
present (positive discount rates) and the future (a zero 
discount rate), some hyperbolic discount factors have 
been recommended (Chichilnisky, 1996; Heal, 1998):
e-ilogt
This procedure, which does not change the value 
of the social discount rate has the advantage that the 
discount factor begins with a positive value, but then 
tends asymptotically towards zero. It also seems to be 
in accordance with professional opinion (Weitzman, 
2001). Therefore, if we introduce a hyperbolic discount 
factor into the exercise, in the simple way suggested 
by Weitzman (ibid.), the present value of the loss 
would be:
NPV = US$ 1.265 billion
Lastly, if these two factors (investment premium 
and hyperbolic discount factor) are simultaneously 
taken into account:
NPV = US$ 1,601 billion
Table 4 summarizes the main results of this 
exercise under different assumptions. As can be seen, 
the fi nal result is highly sensitive to both the price of 
a ton of CO2 equivalent and the discount rate, whereas, 
for instance, the value of non-timber products makes 
little difference to the fi nal cost of deforestation. The 
premium on investment is somewhere between the two, 
having a moderate infl uence on the fi nal result.
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The values range from US$ 421 million to 
US$ 2.197 billion. These values can be compared 
with both the NPV of the existing reserves of the TIT 
18 Paula Suárez, advisor to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy, 
paper presented at the Seminar on Energy and Protected Areas, 
organized by ECLAC and The Nature Conservancy, Santiago, Chile, 
June 2007.
oilfi eld (US$ 3.5 billion) and the amount requested by 
Ecuadorian President Correa on 5 June 2007 for not 
exploiting this oil fi eld: US$ 1.75 billion.18
IX
Conclusions
Oil exports provide badly needed foreign exchange 
to some highly indebted developing countries. Yet oil 
extraction may have serious negative environmental 
impacts. Ecuador is a case in point: oil extraction in the 
Amazon region has been accompanied by a signifi cant 
amount of deforestation. Now that the existing fi elds 
are approaching the end of their economic life, the 
country is granting permits to explore and exploit new 
fi elds close to areas of high ecological value. Since 
most of the deforestation has been due to the arrival 
of settlers following the opening up of new roads built 
in association with oil facilities, the following question 
has been posed: would it be economically justifi able to 
look for new ways to extract oil without opening roads? 
In an attempt to fi nd a possible answer, a simulation 
exercise was carried out in which some economic 
costs associated with the loss of environmental assets 
through deforestation were introduced. It was shown 
that both the direct and indirect losses associated with 
deforestation, mostly due to migration-induced fl ows 
into the area, may be quite high. 
Developing economies cannot easily forgo oil 
export earnings; all the less so since the developed 
world is reluctant to compensate for such potential 
losses by paying for environmental services. Therefore, 
these exports will, in all probability, continue to 
play a critical role in the future. Nevertheless, the 
environmental costs associated with oil exports 
show the social gain that could be achieved (and the 
justifi able amount of investment and the differential 
costs that would be incurred) by minimizing these 
impacts. If, for instance, a country is appraising the 
possibility of opening up new exploration areas to oil 
companies because those already being exploited are 
beginning to show signs of becoming depleted, it should 
consider the benefi ts of investing in exploiting more 
fully (albeit at a higher cost) the recoverable reserves 
of existing wells. Not until this has been done, should 
the country consider bringing on stream new fi elds 
(again, at a higher cost of investment) and this should 
be done without opening up new roads.
(Original: English)
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